





The effects of sanctions on trade in goods between Russia and Finland; compared with other Western countries' development

23. July 2026

Wovon man nicht sprechen darf, darüber muss man schweigen.




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Machine translated from the [Finnish version](#)

1 Introduction

The following figures and tables present the values of various [Standard International Trade Classification \(SITC\)](#) product groups and their indexed development for Finnish exports and imports of goods and exports to and from Russia. In addition, the indexed development of Finland's exports and imports to and from Russia has been compared with the corresponding development of Finland's exports and imports for different countries. Although monthly fluctuations in different product groups may be quite large for exports and imports to one country, an index analysis allows for better conclusions to be drawn than using figures in euros. The indexed development shows how much has been gained or given up in relative terms compared to the initial moment.

In the 2010s, Finland's exports to and imports from the world developed very moderately. The "adaptation" to the lock down brought about by the corona initially reduced both imports and exports somewhat. Stronger growth began at the beginning of 2021 as the corona lock downs eased. Part of the growth in 2021 and 2022 is of course caused by both inflation and significantly higher energy costs.

Monthly customs statistics are published by Finnish Customs on a monthly basis, with the latest available month being at least two months old. For example, the January 2021 foreign trade in goods data was published at the end of March 2021. Compared to other industrialised countries, Finland is relatively slow in publishing its customs statistics. In many countries, customs statistics are published about a month faster, i.e., customs statistics for February would be published at the beginning of April.

Several months before the sanctions began, as much as a fifth of Finland's total imports of goods came from Russia. Those imports were not forced by Russia. Those imports took place because they were economically advantageous. Just before the start of the Ukrainian war, trade in goods with Russia represented about ten percent of Finland's total trade in goods. By the summer of 2024, trade in goods between the countries had almost ceased, meaning we had returned to the situation of the 1930s. Somehow, we Finns seem to have forgotten that Russia, in addition to its enormous size, is the richest country in the world in terms of raw materials and commodities, as well as a long stretch of recent Finnish economic history and Russia's share in that growth story.




Figure 1: Development of the share of goods trade between Finland and Russia

For comparison, Appendix 2 presents the development of the share of trade in goods with the United States, China, Germany and Sweden in Finland's total trade in goods.

The trend in trade between Finland and Russia was downward since the sanctions began in 2014. In the first months of 2016, exports and imports were cut by about half compared to the time before the sanctions. Part of the decline was due to the sanctions, part to the decline in the then world market prices of raw materials and energy imported from Russia. For years, trade between Finland and Russia has been very much in

deficit for Finland. The sharp increase in imports from Russia to Finland in January 2017 was due to the deliveries of gas pipelines related to the start of the construction of the second phase of Nord Stream.




Figure 2: Development of Finland's trade in goods with the world and Russia

Since the beginning of 2018, the value of imports from Russia had reached the level before the sanctions. At that time, exports to Russia were still about a quarter smaller than they were before the sanctions began. The trade balance between the countries, which was already in a severe deficit for Finland, thus became even more in deficit. After the start of the corona period in 2020, the value of imports from Russia decreased significantly. The rapid increase in energy prices in 2021 led to a sharp increase in the value of Russian imports.

The value of Finnish exports to Russia was cut by about a quarter on average quite soon after the sanctions began. Thus, in a highly simplified way, when assessing the cost of the sanctions policy, it could be said that Finland lost this reduction in export revenue and thus the cost of the sanctions to Finland in the period 2015-2021 was a good 10 billion euros in lost export revenue. Estimating Russia's losses in terms of their export revenue from Finland is difficult, because the prices of the most significant product groups, oil, electricity and gas, fluctuate widely. Over the period under review, the amount of revenue Russia received from exports to Finland occasionally exceeded the level before the sanctions for several years. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, trade in goods between Finland and Russia has quickly dwindled to almost non-existent compared to before. If the remaining imports and exports of ores and concentrates are sanctioned, then trade between the countries will be practically at zero.

Finland has had a very deficit in trade in goods with Russia throughout the sanctions review period 2014-2025. When the situation around Ukraine began to tighten in late 2021, the trade deficit between the

countries widened to almost 800 million euros per month for Finland due to the increase in the price of energy products. The trade deficit was also increased by the rapid decline in the value of Finland's exports to Russia, with the value of imports from Russia decreasing significantly more slowly. As a small economy, Finland is certainly able to source the majority or even all of its previous imports from Russia elsewhere, but the restructuring of imports will take time. It remains to be seen how much the price level of these redirected imports of goods previously imported from Russia will increase compared to the previous period and how much we will have to invest in the infrastructure needed for the change. For example, the construction or leasing of LNG terminals and storage facilities is not free or will take place in a few months. Part of this impact of changes in the supply chains of production goods is reflected in the rapidly increasing trade deficit in goods during 2022. The opinion often expressed in Finland, too, that the cessation of Finnish imports from Russia will cause the depletion of "Putin's war chest", is amusing, considering the difference in the size of the countries. Even for the EU as a whole, the significant contraction in goods trade between it and Russia did not cause the depletion of the Russian "war chest". Russia quickly found new markets and trading partners to replace the lost markets.




Figure 3: Development of Finland's trade balance in goods vis-à-vis the world and Russia

Finland's latest known export and import data for goods with Russia can be found at:

- [latest months](#)
- [latest quarters](#)

- [latest annual data](#).

For Finland, especially in terms of imports, imports from Russia have been very significant. The following figure number 4 shows the development of Finland's imports and exports with China, the United States and Russia. From the export part of the figure, it can be seen that the United States has been the most significant export destination for these major powers for most of the time. The few jumps in exports for the United States are deliveries of large cruise ships. For China and Russia, the value of Finland's exports to them has been roughly the same until the beginning of the Ukrainian war. During the Ukrainian war, exports to Russia fell sharply, while for China, the value of exports to it has continued to grow slowly.

In terms of imports in euros, Russia was the clear leader before the events of early 2022. China is second in terms of imports and the USA is last. During the war in Ukraine, the importance of the USA as an importing country has also increased. Part of the increase is due to the increase in imports of Sitc group 3. During January-October 2022, the growth in this group was over 400 percent compared to the same period of the previous year. In other words, the USA has managed to capture a considerable share of Finland's previous purchases of energy products from Russia. Unfortunately, for the Finnish economy, this did not happen on the most favourable terms and prices. President Trump's second term in office in the United States has brought with it an interesting addition to the budget with daily changing tariff and economic threats.




Figure 4: Development of Finnish exports and imports with the United States, China and Russia

As the table below shows, despite a couple of dozen sanction packages and Finland's almost uncompromising "willingness" to comply with them, Finland's exports and imports with Russia have been many times higher throughout the period under review than our exports and imports with Ukraine¹. In particular, imports from Ukraine to Finland have been quite small in value.

		June 2013 <i>million €</i>	November 2016 <i>million €</i>	November 2019 <i>million €</i>	November 2021 <i>million €</i>	November 2022 <i>million €</i>	November 2025 <i>million €</i>
Export	Russia	424.6	283.6	287.1	346.2	197.7	5.3
	Ukraine	29.7	16.6	19.6	24.2	12.6	14.6
Import	Russia	726.1	588.0	653.1	999.4	274.1	81.3
	Ukraine	2.5	3.6	3.1	6.3	4.4	5.5
							Source: Eurostat

Finland's military aid to Ukraine had increased to 3.1 billion euros by the beginning of 2026. In total, Finland had spent 4 billion euros on supporting Ukraine.

The Helsinki stock exchange has reached record levels during the sanctions period, having recovered from the sharp decline caused by the corona lockdowns. After the start of the war in Ukraine, the Finnish stock exchange index had been trending downwards despite the significant inflation that had begun for the first couple of years of the war. It is also an indication of Finland's radically changed position in the current geopolitical situation and its accession to NATO.




Figure 5: OMX Helsinki 25

Appendix 4 presents the development of the stock prices of a few large Finnish companies during the sanctions against Russia. **Patria Oyj** is currently the “core” of the Finnish arms industry. The Finnish state owns 50.1 percent of Patria and, since 2016, 49.9 percent of the Norwegian **Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace (KDA)**. Figure 6 below shows the development of the stock price of the Kongsberg Group, the majority of whose turnover comes from KDA, during the sanctions period. When the situation began to tighten with regard to Ukraine in 2021, Kongsberg's stock price has since rapidly multiplied. Several other listed companies operating in the European defence industry have also experienced similar developments. American defence industry companies have had more consistent success on the stock markets, most obviously due to the fact that they have had more exploitable military conflicts over the decades. Patria Corporation was number 98 on the list of the 100 largest defense industry companies in 2025, and **Kongsberg Gruppen** was number 59.




Figure 6: Kongsberg Group's share price development

For Neste Corporation, which previously benefited from the proximity of crude oil supplies from Russia and the low cost of oil, Russia's war in Ukraine and the resulting change in crude oil procurement have caused a significant downward trend in the share price development.



Figure 7: Development of Neste Corporation's share value during the sanctions period

On April 4, 2023, Finland joined Nato as the 31st member state. One of the arguments for membership was how increased security would increase Finland's economic success through investments directed here. This has not happened due to Finland's changed geopolitical position. Before joining NATO, Finland's employment development in the 2010s, after the start of sanctions, roughly followed the level and development trends of the common unemployment rate of the EU countries. From 2023 onwards, when the EU27 unemployment rate had stabilised at six percent, Finland's unemployment rate began to rise rapidly, reaching the highest unemployment rate of the EU countries at the turn of 2026. While Finnish decision-makers boast about how our previously most significant trading partner had been successfully "eliminated" from our economy at a rapid pace and the border had been closed, and while the government was eagerly planning where to free up funds for the armaments demanded by NATO, something was overlooked or at least not acknowledged. The decisions and policies have come at a terrible price. In this situation, the demands of the Finnish Business Council's **Jyri Häkämies** in April 2026 that Finns must work more are

pathetic. Extending working hours for those still working and who have a work is unlikely to help the unemployed find jobs.




Figure 8: The Monthly Development of Finland's Unemployment Rate

2 Finland's exports to Russia in various Sitc product groups




Figure 9: Development of the structure of Finnish exports to Russia (the column for the current year consists of the sums of the values for the known actual months)

Russia, as Finland's neighbor, has historically been one of Finland's largest, and at times the largest, foreign trade partners in terms of the value of goods. One of Finland's few geographical economic competitive advantages is that Finland is a close neighbor to one of Russia's most important industrial and commercial centers, the St. Petersburg economic region. From a military perspective, the proximity of St. Petersburg and Murmansk has also been the greatest risk for Finland.

In exports to Russia, road transport has traditionally been the most significant form of transport. In our exports to Russia, which have dried up due to the war in Ukraine, the share of sea transport has increased. The use of the Saimaa Canal has practically ceased.

Export	2021		2022		2023		2024		2025	
	1000 €	%	1000 €	%	1000 €	%	1000 €	%	1000 €	%
1 Sea transport (including car ferry and train ferry transport)	263,722	7.0	364,927	17.4	338,063	50.5	203,825	56.9	200,814	65.8
2 Rail transport	629,176	16.8	407,888	19.5	56	0.0	0		25	0.0
3 Road transport (only possible at the border)	2,837,918	75.6	1,314,456	62.8	329,667	49.2	150,820	42.1	86,073	28.2
4 Air transport	22,246	0.6	3,875	0.2	307	0.0	3,489	1.0	18,045	5.9
5 Postal consignments	341	0.0	19	0.0	15	0.0	1	0.0	0	
7 Stationary modes of transport (pipe, cable, electric cable)	0		4	0.0	0		0		0	
8 Inland water transport (the Saimaa canal)	0		0		0		0		0	
9 Own propulsion (watercraft and aircraft)	1,345	0.0	1,606	0.1	1,282	0.2	73	0.0	24	0.0
0 Unknown mode of transport	0		0		0		0		0	
*0-9 All modes of transport together	3,754,748	100.0	2,092,776	100.0	669,390	100.0	358,208	100.0	304,981	100.0

As the following figure shows, the sanctions have had a strong impact on Finland's exports to Russia. In a relatively short time after the sanctions began, the value of exports was cut by more than 30-40 percent. Part of this is due to the sanctions, part to the lower prices of raw materials, especially oil products, and part to the reduced demand from Russia's own economy. After the war in Ukraine began, exports to Russia decreased dramatically. In October 2023, the value of Finnish exports to Russia was only 3.4 percent of what it had been before the sanctions began. Before the sanctions began, Russia was one of Finland's largest export destinations. In May 2025, Russia was Finland's 51st most significant export destination.




Figure 10: Indexed development of Finnish exports, Sitc all groups total

2.1 Food (Sitc 0)

Russia's counter-sanctions included the cessation of food imports (Sitc 0) from the countries that had initiated sanctions against Russia. For Finland, this resulted in monthly food exports to Russia being only about 20 percent of what they had been before the sanctions. In 2013, food exports to Russia represented just under a third (29.3 percent) of the total exports of the product sector in question. After the sanctions began, about 10 percent of the total exports of the food sector had gone to Russia. During the war in Ukraine, the value of the sector's Russian exports has been approaching zero. Considering Finland's previous investments and the successes and popularity of Finnish food exports to Russia, the loss has been considerable. Previously, many popular Finnish food products in the St. Petersburg region have received Russian "copies" in recent years. The sanctions period has proven to be nationally significant for Russia, as its long-neglected food industry has been quite successfully "renovated" and expanded.




Figure 11: Indexed development of Finnish exports, food products (Sitc 0)

One of the few advantages of Finland's geographical location has been its proximity to the considerably large market of St. Petersburg. With a population of 5.6 million, St. Petersburg is the fourth largest city in Europe. The Finnish food industry in particular took advantage of this. Finnish food products were quite popular in the St. Petersburg region. Finland benefited from this both in cross-border shopping tourism and in food exports. The withdrawal of Finnish companies from the Russian market during the sanctions and especially during the war in Ukraine, and the significant deterioration of relations between the countries, have led to the fact that the chances of the Finnish food industry and retailers returning to the St. Petersburg market after the war has calmed down are apparently quite limited.

After the war in Ukraine had been going on for more than two years, the Finnish media had raised the issue of a few international Western food giants still producing chocolate and ice cream in their factories in Russia. The media demanded that Finnish companies that used the products of these giants stop using and selling them in Finland. Somehow, Finns, along with other Europeans, have forgotten that making ice cream does not require special skills and that a nation that builds nuclear power plants and the world's most advanced rockets is certainly capable of making the ice cream it uses.

2.2 Raw materials (Sitc 2)

In the 2020s, Finland began to supply Russia with an increasing amount of raw materials (Sitc 2). The largest product groups in this group were Sitc 283 (copper ore and concentrates). Those copper ores and concentrates were returned to Russia by Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta¹ after the nickel was separated from the

¹ Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy is based on Outokumpu Oyj's nickel refining operations, which were sold to the American OM Group in 2000. In 2007, OMG sold the Harjavalta plant to the Russian Norilsk Nickel Group.

nickel concentrate imported to the plant in Harjavalta, Finland. The import of that nickel concentrate has been considered so important that the EU has not sanctioned its import and has no choice but to allow the Russian-owned Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy to refine it in Finland.




Figure 12: Indexed development of Finnish exports, raw materials (Sic 2)

2.3 Fuels and lubricants, electric current (Sic 3)

In 2013, two-thirds of Finland's imports of mineral oil and mineral oil products (Sic 33) still came from Russia. Thanks to its relatively large oil refining capacity, Finland has also been a significant exporter of refined mineral oil products (Sic 334). In 2013, five percent of the value of exports of products in this sector was earned by exporting them to Russia. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the European Union's politicians have been trying to reduce the export and import of energy products to Russia. Finland has been a political model student in this game, albeit at a relatively high cost to the national economy.




Figure 13: Indexed development of Finnish exports, fuels and lubricants (Sic 3)

2.4 Chemical industry products (Sitc 5)

Finnish chemical industry products (Sitc 5) exports to Russia consist of, among others, pharmaceuticals and plastics. After the sanctions began, the value of their exports decreased by a good twenty percent compared to the time before the sanctions. Since then, the decreasing trend has continued and, since the start of the war in Ukraine, the value of this product group is now only a few percent of what it was at the beginning (about 100 million/month).




Figure 14: Indexed development of Finnish exports, chemical industry products (Sitc 5)

2.5 Manufactured goods by ingredient (Sitc 6)

In the manufactured goods (Sitc 6) group, paper and cardboard and products made from them (Sitc 64) represented more than half of our exports to Russia in that group. During the war in Ukraine, Finnish exports to Russia have almost completely ceased. At the same time, imports of roundwood from Russia had ceased. In 2021, roundwood imported from Russia (9.3 million cubic meters) covered 10 percent of the wood used in our country's forest industry.




Figure 15: Indexed development of Finnish exports, manufactured goods (Sitc 6)

During the sanctions period, exports of paper and cardboard and products (Sitc 64) from them to Russia had been quite steady compared to many other product groups. When the war in Ukraine began, most of the paper exports to Russia stopped within a few months. Perhaps the idea was that the dual use of paper products in the war plays a decisive role. Since Russia has been required to adhere to its long-term trade agreements with uranium, oil and gas in several cases, it is strange that Finnish companies would have concluded trade agreements with paper, for example, and renewed them after each delivery, which would be the only way to immediately stop imports in their entirety.

In any case, Finnish paper producers gave up a customer whose annual purchases of paper products were still worth 440 million euros in 2021. As the curve of total paper product exports shows, this removal of Russia from the customer base was compensated by sales elsewhere. The development of the value of Sitc 64 exports also shows that over the past decade, paper and its products have not been a "growth sector" of the national economy.




Figure 16: Indexed development of Finnish exports, paper and cardboard (Sitc 64)

2.6 Machinery and equipment and means of transport (Sitc 7)

In the years before the war in Ukraine, exports of machinery and equipment and transport equipment (Sitc 7) to Russia had represented just over ten percent of the total exports of this product group. In January 2016, exports of machinery and equipment and transport equipment to Russia were just over half of the level of previous months. In December 2016, exports of this product group had recovered to the level before the sanctions began. The impact of the events in Ukraine on Russian exports of this product group has been considerable, although there is a large monthly variation. The war in Ukraine ended exports of machinery and equipment to Russia within a few months. After the war had been going on for about a year, exports of this product group to Russia were almost zero. The export of machinery and equipment essentially involves the supply of spare parts when needed. Since this essential component from the point of view of the Russian buyer and user of the equipment has become sanctioned, the export of machinery and equipment to Russia will certainly face considerable difficulties in the future. Who would be willing/dare to buy a Finnish plane if, due to US demands, it would be impossible to get maintenance and spare parts for it?




Figure 17: Indexed development of Finnish exports, machinery and equipment and transport equipment (Sic 7)

2.7 Miscellaneous manufactured goods (Sic 8)

The group's miscellaneous manufactured goods (Sic 8) exports from Russia include, among others, clothing (Sic 84) and instruments and meters (Sic 87).




Figure 18: Indexed development of Finnish exports, miscellaneous manufactured goods (Sic 8)

3 Finland's import from Russia




Figure 19: Finnish imports from Russia, value and structure (the column for the current year consists of the sums of the values for the known actual months)

Finland has imported mainly raw materials from Russia, such as energy-related products – coal, oil, gas and electricity. Imports from Russia have decreased in euro terms during the sanctions period, being for a long time more than a third lower than what imports from there were before the sanctions. The main reason for this had been the significant decrease in world market prices for oil and metals. The increase in crude oil prices in late 2016 raised the value of imports in December almost to the level at the beginning of the sanctions.

The corona period in the early months of 2020 quickly cut the value of Finnish imports of Russian goods. The reason for this was in particular the decrease in the world market price of oil. As the situation around Ukraine tightened and the corona lockdowns eased in 2021, the prices of oil and other products required for energy production rose significantly.

In imports, sea and rail transport were the most significant forms of transport before the events in Ukraine led to war. As for 2023, even after imports were reduced to almost non-existent compared to before, rail transport was then the main mode of transport.

Import	2021		2022		2023		2024		2025	
	1000 €	%	1000 €	%	1000 €	%	1000 €	%	1000 €	%
1 Sea transport (including car ferry and train ferry transport)	3,939,763	45.7	2,199,994	36.2	95,329	6.6	70,321	7.9	25,030	3.1
2 Rail transport	2,480,869	28.8	2,520,946	41.4	1,334,746	92.2	814,713	91.1	781,260	95.7
3 Road transport (only possible at the border)	906,543	10.5	476,016	7.8	11,553	0.8	3,559	0.4	2,941	0.4
4 Air transport	13,397	0.2	11,053	0.2	6,342	0.4	5,812	0.6	6,968	0.9
5 Postal consignments	1,299	0.0	425	0.0	23	0.0	13	0.0	10	0.0
7 Stationary modes of transport (pipe, cable, electric cable)	1,265,331	14.7	874,150	14.4	0		0		0	
8 Inland water transport (the Saimaa canal)	11,906	0.1	0		0		0		0	
9 Own propulsion (watercraft and aircraft)	0		0		0		0		0	
0 Unknown mode of transport	0		0		0		0		0	
*0-9 All modes of transport together	8,619,108	100.0	6,082,583	100.0	1,447,994	100.0	894,419	100.0	816,210	100.0

During the war in Ukraine, imports from Russia have dwindled to almost non-existent compared to before. In November 2023, imports of goods from Russia were worth only 7 percent of what they were before the sanctions began. Taking into account the inflation that has occurred over that nearly ten years and has accelerated rapidly in recent years, the real value of that value is less than what that 7 percent of the value would correspond to.




Figure 20: Indexed development of Finnish imports, all SITC groups combined

3.1 Import of raw materials (Sitc 2)

For Sitc product group 2, raw materials, imports from Russia include such items as ores, scrap metal, timber and paper pulp. Even before the sanctions, In Russia had periodically been made demands to stop exporting raw wood to Finland, which would naturally make it difficult for our forest industry to find replacement suppliers and, in the worst case, lead to the closure of some of our production facilities.




Figure 21: Indexed development of Finnish imports, raw materials (Sitc 2)

Before the start of the Ukrainian war, imports of timber (Sitc 24) from Russia were one of the most significant import items. Almost a tenth of the Finnish forest industry's production volume was based on imported Russian roundwood. During 2022, these imports ceased.




Figure 22: Indexed development of Finnish imports, wood and cork (Sitc 24)

As the sanctions "progress", ores and scrap metal (Sitc 28) have become an increasingly significant product group in imports from Russia. A large part of these imports is nickel ore and concentrate (Sitc 284), from which nickel is produced in Finland for the battery industry, for example. It remains to be seen how long these imports will continue in the midst of the ever-tightening rounds of sanctions caused by the war in Ukraine and the EU's current very short-sighted and costly economic policy. If the Russian-owned Norilsk

Nickel Harjavalta oy is left without this raw material, Finland's dreams as a major player in the battery industry will experience a final hard crash without Russian ores and metals. Russian nickel concentrate has been brought to Harjavalta by train, and after VR refused to transport it, it is now being transported by locomotives of Nurminen Logistics and Operail Finland oy, a company previously owned by the Estonian state. The rail transport company owned by Nurminen Logistics is now called North Rail oy. In June 2023, 68 percent of Finland's remaining imports from Russia were these nickel concentrates, and a significant part of Finland's remaining exports to Russia are the returns of these concentrates to Russia for copper separation. At the end of March 2023, the Southwest Finland ELY Centre concluded that the **Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta** expansion project was feasible in terms of environmental impacts.

Even if a significant amount of new ores leading to mines were found in Finland's own soil, their role would be minor in this situation, where new battery industry production plants are now being located and built around the world. The location of battery industry production plants in Finland would largely be based on the import of ores and concentrates from Russia, with Chinese and Central European chemical giants financing the construction of the plants. In the most likely economic and military realism after the war in Ukraine, it is highly unlikely that Russia would start supplying strategically important valuable raw materials here in Finland for processing. It is more than likely that a large part of the production capacity for battery metal chemicals will be built on the Russian side. Finland, located in the Baltic Sea and now isolated from Russia, is geographically completely isolated if and when the necessary concentrates are brought by ship for processing from Australia, Africa, etc. from destinations across the oceans. In this case, it makes much more economic sense to build battery metal factories worth billions on the shores of the North Sea and the European Atlantic Ocean, close to European battery users of the products, for example in the manufacture of cars. After these lessons offered by the 19th round of sanctions, Russia will certainly think very carefully now and especially in the future about what is exported to where, regardless of which group and persons controls Russia.



Figure 23: Indexed development of Finnish imports, ores and scrap metal (Sitc 28)

The following figure shows the development of the situation for the corresponding product group according to Eurostat data. We can only wonder about the purpose of the measure. Also, who has requested this “data change” in the official EU databases, is a relevant question, to which we are unlikely to get a clear answer.



Figure 24: Indexed development of Finnish imports, ores and scrap metal (Sic 28) using the Data in Eurostat

3.2 Fuels and lubricants, electric current (Sic 3)

Imports of mineral oil, gases and electricity, Sic product group 3, represented more than three-quarters of our imports from Russia. The significant decrease in world market prices for oil and energy has contributed to a decrease in the euro value of Russian imports of this product group. The increase in oil prices at the end of 2016 returned the value of this product group almost to the level at the beginning of the sanctions. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, repeated sanction packages have led to a situation in which 90 percent of the imports of this product group as a whole have been “lost”. As a small economy and a country with surprisingly diverse energy production, Finland has not had a problem finding replacement sources of purchase, i.e. non-Russian suppliers of these goods that are vital to society. The problem is the significantly increased cost of purchasing them in energy and other production.




Figure 25: Indexed development of Finnish imports, fuels and lubricants (Sic 3)

In 2013, 65 percent of mineral oils and mineral oil products imported into Finland were imported from Russia. In January-September 2015, the share of Russian imports in this product group was 60.3 percent. During the Corona period in January-April 2020, Russia's share of imports in the product group was 56.4 percent. In

January 2023, imports of products in the product group from Russia to Finland had practically ceased. At that time, about half of the imports of products in the product group came from Norway².




Figure 26: Indexed development of Finnish imports, mineral oils and their products (Sitc 33)

In 2013, as much as 85 percent of Finland's crude oil imports came from Russia. The Porvoo refinery's process has been tuned to utilize Russian crude oil. Introducing a new and different type of crude oil requires significant and time-consuming adjustments and investments in the refinery's process. In addition, transporting almost all the crude oil needed a few hundred kilometres to the refinery was a considerable competitive advantage for Neste.




Figure 27: Indexed development of Finnish imports, crude oil (Sitc 333)

Natural gas imported to Finland has previously come from Russia. In recent years, gas imports have been diversified by building smaller LNG terminals and a transmission pipeline between Estonia and Finland. Finland stopped importing natural gas delivered via pipelines from Russia, after Russia demanded payments in rubles. However, Finland began to buy LNG gas from Russia, which is many times more expensive. The problem with the availability of natural gas is common to Europe. It takes years to build a sufficient LNG

² [Link to the latest known months of imports of mineral oils and mineral oil products \(Sitc 33\) from various countries to Finland and exports from Finland](#)

terminal and storage base, with construction costing an astronomical sum. LNG is significantly more expensive than Russian pipeline gas. The problem is how the European heavy and energy production industry, which has used natural gas, can adapt to the significantly increased price of gas and, in the coming years, the uncertainty of its supply and strong fluctuations in the purchase price. It is difficult to understand how that adaptation would be possible without a significant contraction in industrial production, especially in Central Europe. The USA has been active in marketing the transfer of European companies to the United States. One of the competitive factors in the transfer is the significantly lower energy price offered to US companies now that the EU's previous competitive advantage, i.e. its affordable energy procurement, has been eliminated.




Figure 28: Indexed development of Finnish imports, gases (Sitc 34) Finnish Customs data

The corresponding indexed data from Eurostat for gas (Sitc 34) looks like the figure below.




Figure 29: Indexed development of Finnish imports, gases (Sitc 34) Eurostat data

The starting point in Eurostat's data is that they are based on the data of the sending country. This is the case for most product groups in terms of the data sent by Finnish customs. However, the situation is special for gases (and nickel concentrate). The value of pipeline gas supplied by Russia to Finland has "disappeared" from Eurostat's data. [The situation is described in more detail in the article at the following link.](#)

Electricity (Sitc 35) was imported from Russia in significant quantities, thus ensuring a sufficient electricity supply in Finland at a low cost. As the situation around Ukraine became more tense and energy prices rose, electricity imports from Russia also rose to record levels. A few months after the actual war in Ukraine began, Finland also ended its long-standing electricity imports from Russia.




Figure 30: Indexed development of Finnish imports, electricity (Sitc 35)

3.3 Chemical industry products (Sitc 5)

Chemical industry products (Sitc 5) imported by Finland from Russia include organic (Sitc 51) and inorganic elements (Sitc 52). Fertilizers (Sitc 54) have also been imported in significant quantities.




Figure 31: Indexed development of Finnish imports, chemical products (Sitc 5)

3.4 Manufactured goods by ingredient (Sitc 6)

Imports of manufactured goods (Sitc 6) from Russia include iron, steel and other metals. Rubber and wood products were also imported in significant quantities.



Figure 32: Indexed development of Finnish imports, basic manufactures (Sitc 6)

The monthly imports of goods groups Sitc 7 and Sitc 8 to Finland from Russia have been so small that no separate index picture has been created for them.

- [The latest published data on trade in goods between Finland and Russia can be read via the following link.](#)
- [Annual import and export data at Sitc classification level 3 can be found at the link.](#)

4 Development in different countries compared to Finland's development

In early September 2024, Yahoo Finance changed its policy on downloading time series for listed companies, indices, etc. Previously, this was free, but after the change, it became quite valuable. As a result, the data for some of the charts in this presentation only goes back to August-September 2024. The data for some of the charts has been manually updated at a few time points to show the direction of the development.

As a rule, the index describing the overall status of Finnish exports to Russia developed during the sanctions, before the war in Ukraine, in the same rhythm as in most comparison countries. In the period before the start of the Ukrainian war in 2022, exports to Russia decreased quite significantly, while imports from Russia suffered less from the sanctions. Just before the corona period, monthly imports from Russia exceeded the level in currency terms before the sanctions, and the trade balance has mostly been in Russia's favor throughout the entire sanctions period. The bilateral trade balance of goods with various countries was mostly in significant surplus for Russia even before the sanctions. Thus, the impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy has been less than planned/desired. Especially for those countries that are the most aggressive and vocal in public towards Russia, imports from Russia have developed "surprisingly", often very significantly exceeding the value of imports from the period before the sanctions. For example, the monthly imports of the United States from Russia since March 2021 have been 25-50 percent higher than just before the sanctions began. The majority of US imports from Russia consisted of mineral oil products (Sitc 33). When the war in Ukraine began in February 2022, this situation changed radically.

For most of the countries in this analysis, exports to Russia have been a relatively small percentage of their total merchandise exports. The monthly percentage of Russian exports to the country's total exports before the sanctions ranged from 0.33 percent for Canada to 27 percent for Ukraine. Since the sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions began, monthly exports to Russia in early 2015 were 25–50 percent lower than before the sanctions. For most countries, imports from Russia consist mainly of commodities that are very important to the society and economy of the importing country. These include oil, natural gas, various metals, grain, fertilizers, etc.

The effects of the war between Russia and Ukraine began to affect export and import data for February 2022 and the following months. The impact of skyrocketing inflation and the increase in the cost of raw materials and commodities on the figures is also significant. Surprisingly, imports from Russia had increased significantly in many countries during the first month of the war, March, while countries' exports to Russia contracted as sharply as expected. At least based on customs statistics for the first months after the war began, Western countries quite successfully sanctioned their own exports to Russia, but have often been so dependent on Russian-produced commodities that completely excluding Russia from Western markets seems to have failed dramatically. It is clear that the "elimination" of a state, which is the world's largest producer of raw materials and commodities in many sectors, from the market would only be possible if there were equivalent quantities of the products in question unused and waiting to be sold somewhere. This was naturally not the case, and the wisdom of the flamboyant and openly stated comments by Western leaders in recent years that sanctions are aimed at destroying the Russian economy has been highly questionable.

The following figures show the development of the euro- and dollar-ruble exchange rate during the sanctions period.




Figure 33: Development of the ruble exchange rate during sanctions

After the war in Ukraine began, the West began imposing very strong sanctions against Russia, with US and European politicians openly stating that their goal was to destroy the Russian economy and “empty Putin’s war chest.” At first, the Ruble exchange rate plummeted to a record low, especially due to the seizure of the Russian Central Bank’s assets. However, the Russian Central Bank quickly managed to stabilize the ruble’s exchange rate and return it to a “normal” level. The reason for this was the conversion of the invoicing currency of many goods sold by Russia from dollars and euros to rubles or local currencies, and the provision of oil and gas to large buyers, such as China and India, at considerable discounts.

The Russian economic system has proven to be significantly stronger than it has been assumed to be in Western assessments and, above all, in the “analyses” constantly offered by our own media. Somehow, Western estimates had forgotten that Russia is the world’s largest country by area, has a fairly developed industry, produces nuclear power plants and space equipment, and is one of the world’s most significant producers of many vital raw materials and commodities. It is little more than the gas station equipped with nuclear weapons often depicted in Western propaganda. In March 2023, it was reported that Russia’s inflation rate was now lower than the inflation that Western countries suffer from. According to [the IMF’s 2024 forecast for purchasing power parity adjusted gross domestic product, Russia is ranked 4th](#) and has just overtaken Japan and Germany, which were previously ahead of Russia. Russia as a state is almost debt-free compared to its Western opponents.




Figure 34: Development of the Ruble exchange rate during the Ukrainian war

The start and continuation of the war in Ukraine significantly strengthened the US dollar (USD) against most major currencies.

The figures describing the development of the value of foreign trade in goods of different EU countries with the major powers the United States, China and Russia can be found by clicking on the following link. The economic and influence competition between the various major powers during the sanctions period is clearly reflected in many countries. In Europe, Russia has been pushed aside and in recent years, China's success as the largest importer of many EU countries has slowed. The trade balances of several EU countries in trade in goods with Russia and China have also been quite deficit during the sanctions period, and traditionally have often been surplus in trade with the United States³.

4.1 United States

During the sanctions period, Finnish exports to Russia have at times decreased faster than the United States has decreased its exports to Russia. The United States has been the leading force in defining and initiating, informing, maintaining and strengthening these sanctions. In 2013, exports to Russia represented 0.7 percent of total US exports of goods, representing as significant a role for the United States in terms of monetary relative share as its exports to Lithuania represent for Finland. In 2013, Russian exports accounted for 9.6 percent of Finnish exports of goods and Russia was Finland's most important foreign trade partner. In 2015, exports to Russia were only 5.9 percent of Finland's total exports and Russia was Finland's third most important trading partner. During the war in Ukraine, Russian exports have been just over 10 percent of what they were worth before the sanctions began.

During the sanctions period, about one percent of the US's monthly value of goods imports came from Russia. [In 2021, the US imported \\$17.5 billion worth of mineral oil and mineral oil products from Russia, according to the US Census Bureau's merchandise trade statistics.](#) In relation to the US's fierce opposition to Nord Stream 1 and 2 and the fear of Europe's dependence on Russia's role in its energy markets, this was quite "amusing". The price of Nord Stream 2 construction has been said to be about \$11 billion, half of which was Russia's share. It is somewhat confusing that the US was able to consider Russia one of its largest oil suppliers and at the same time roar that Europe should stop or at least severely limit its cheap natural gas and oil imports from Russia. Natural gas imported from Russia through gas pipelines has been significantly cheaper for Europe, than LNG gas purchased from the US has been or could be. Even after the war between Russia and Ukraine began, the USA continued to import oil products from Russia during its first months. There have been many claims that while the import of oil products from Russia to the EU countries has frozen, Russian oil products are still imported through third countries, in which case the country of origin has been "lost". In addition, the customs authorities of some countries have recorded imports from Russia as country code QZ, unspecified country for military or economic reasons, foreign trade. The following pages present [US exports and imports by country for mineral oils and petroleum products \(Sitc 33\)](#) and [gases \(Sitc 34\) according to US customs statistics](#) for the last known months.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	USA	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	USA	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.1	0.2	0.1
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	USA	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.1
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

The latest available monthly data on US exports and imports of goods to Russia can be found at https://karirast.com/USA-GB/4621_sitc_m.html. The latest available monthly data on imports from and US exports to Ukraine can be found at the following link. After almost two years of the war in Ukraine, the United States still imported \$244 million worth of goods from Russia in January 2024. The most significant of these was Sitc 525 (radioactive and similar substances), which represented 55.1 percent of imports. Other major

³ The deficit and surplus of the EU countries' trade balance: 1) [with Russia and their total trade in goods](#) and 2) [with China and the United States](#).

import product groups were Sitc 562 (manufactured fertilisers, other than fertilisers of group 272), 29.2 per cent of imports, and Sitc 714 (other engines and motors (other than those of groups 712, 713 and 718), excluding electric motors; parts of such engines) 5.7 percent. Given the highly strained relations between the countries, these product groups most likely represent those Russian products that the United States cannot obtain elsewhere. Of particular interest is the continued import of Russian fuel for nuclear power plants, when the US leadership, in its statements and actions, considered that Europe was endangering itself by importing cheap Russian energy.




Figure 35: Indexed development of US exports to and imports from Russia

The US economy has strengthened during the Ukraine war and during Biden's era, if the exchange rate and stock market indices are used as a measure. In particular, for many companies belonging to the so-called military-industrial complex, the events in Ukraine have had a significant impact on the development of their stock prices, accompanied by new orders for the production of weapons and clearance sales of old stocks. The cheapness of energy prices in the United States has also given its companies an advantage over their European competitors, as they have lost the advantage they previously had from purchasing cheap energy. Trump's era has begun with unseen turbulence in US economy and foreign relations.

Despite its role as Ukraine's "main supporter" since 2014, [trade in goods between the United States and Ukraine has remained quite modest](#). Monthly exports to Ukraine have been worth a few hundred million dollars at best, with imports being somewhat less. Iron and steel accounted for more than half of U.S. imports from Ukraine (Sitc 67).

4.2 Canada

Canada's trade in goods with Russia, both imports and exports, had been very small even before the sanctions were imposed. During the war in Ukraine, both exports and imports between the countries have dwindled to almost nothing.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Canada	0.33	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.01	0.003
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Canada	0.36	0.21	0.28	0.22	0.01	0.001
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3




Figure 36: Indexed development of Canadian exports to and imports from Russia

4.3 Japan

Japan's trade in goods with Russia has developed at the same "rhythm" as EU countries on average.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Japan	1.6	0.7	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.3
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Japan	2.5	1.9	2.1	2.5	1.2	0.7
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Japan	2.1	1.3	1.5	1.9	1.0	0.5
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: e-Stat Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan and Eurostat




Figure 37: Indexed development of Japan's exports to and imports from Russia




Figure 38: Indexed development of Japan exports to and imports from Russia

4.4 Great Britain

After Brexit, the UK's trade statistics and the publication of data changed. In terms of imports from Russia, Russia was among the UK's top 20 importers until the start of the war in Ukraine, and thus data on imports from Russia in recent months was available until then. UK exports to Russia have been relatively low. Along with the US, the UK has been a leading "power" in supporting Ukraine militarily and steering events. The London Metal Exchange (LME) has said it will continue to broker metals produced by Russia despite the sanctions. In February 2023, the LME announced that it would stop storing Russian metals in its US-registered warehouses. The LME's suspension notices for **Nornickel Harjavalta's** nickel briquette and cathode brands issued on 3 July 2024 were withdrawn by the LME before the deadline.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Great Britain	1.3	0.86	0.61	1.1	0.17	0.19
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Great Britain	1.3	1.1	1.6	1.4	0.03	0.01
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Great Britain	1.3	1.0	1.2	1.3	0.09	0.08
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: UK Trade Team ja Eurostat




Figure 39: Indexed development of UK exports to and imports from Russia

The United Kingdom has been, along with the United States, the most significant supporter of Ukraine in recent decades. When we look at how trade between Ukraine and Russia has developed, we can conclude that the support has not been based on economic interests in Ukraine.




Figure 40: Development of UK exports and imports with Russia and Ukraine




Figure 41: Evolution of UK's export and import values with China, the United States and Russia

4.5 Ireland

Trade in goods between Ireland and Russia has been almost insignificant in monetary terms for both parties. Of the major powers, the United States is by far the largest exporter, with exports to it being almost as valuable as Ireland's exports to the EU single market. This is exceptionally even among EU member states. Normally, countries' exports to the EU internal market are many times higher than exports to one of the major powers.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Ireland	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.2
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Ireland	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.1	0.2	0.0
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Ireland	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.2	0.1
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Eurostat




Figure 42: Indexed development of Irish exports to and imports from Russia

4.6 Germany

Finnish and German exports to Russia have developed at the same pace during the sanctions. In November 2022, German exports accounted for less than one percent of Germany's total exports of goods. Due to the events in Ukraine, more than half of exports to Russia decreased rapidly in one year.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Germany	3.2	1.9	2.0	2.1	0.8	0.5
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Germany	4.2	2.8	2.7	2.7	1.0	0.1
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Germany	3.7	2.3	2.3	2.4	0.9	0.3
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	

Finland and Germany have also developed similarly in terms of imports from Russia. Russian energy imports, in the form of gas, oil and coal, were very important for the structure and competitiveness of the German economy. After the Nord Stream pipeline explosion, Germany's access to Russian pipeline gas has been limited and Germany has been frantically trying to find replacement gas suppliers. The problem for Germany has been that LNG gas imported from afar is significantly more expensive compared to the previous Russian pipeline gas and that Germany did not have terminals to receive LNG when the change took place. For some reason, in the Eurostat (The Statistical Office of the European Communities) foreign trade statistics Sitc 34, gases, Germany has "lost" almost all of its imports from Russia and the United States. Germany's largest import country in customs statistics for gas imports is QZ - unspecified country for military or economic reasons, foreign trade. In 2022, 71 percent of Germany's gas imports came from this "unknown country" and natural gas imports from Russia (RU) were only worth 11 million euros in 2022, according to statistics. Naturally, leaders who have chosen this QZ approach will have difficulty explaining that the gas pipelines came from an unspecified country and not from Russia. It is amazing how far EU leaders are willing to go to manipulate the "official truth".

It is clear that Germany has no military reason to conceal Russian gas import data in its statistics, because Russia knows the volume of gas it supplies and the price it receives for it. Economic reasons are also difficult to justify with regard to Russian gas import data. It is also unclear whether EU sanctions apply to imports from a country with the code QZ. This use of QZ also significantly reduces the value of imports from Russia in the statistics. What makes this use of QZ even stranger in the case of gas is that quite significant imports from Russia of mineral oil and products derived from it (Sitc 33) have not been "censored" for economic and military reasons.

In December 2023, new US sanctions targeted companies building a large LNG export terminal in Ust-Luga. Is the US doing this to protect its own LNG exports to Europe and their prices, or to prevent Russia from earning more revenue from increased LNG exports? In any case, the measure is not intended to improve the EU's energy procurement opportunities and energy prices here.




Figure 43: Germany's import of gases (Sitc 34)

In the case of US LNG gas, the concealment of the gas price charged by the US is justified, at least for the domestic German public, so that it does not become enraged by the situation. The problem with this strategy is that US customs statistics also show their gas export prices for Germany. During 2024, the US had exported gas to Germany (Sitc 34) worth a good 1.9 billion dollars. During the first months of 2025, the value of gas imported by Germany from the US per month has been between 160-270 million dollars.

Since the sanctions culminate in the significance and regrettable current state of the Ukraine-Russia relationship and the position adopted by the EU countries, the following table presents the monetary values of Germany's imports and exports to Ukraine and Russia by month of review. Before the sanctions began, Germany's monthly exports to Russia were more than six times the value of Germany's exports to Ukraine¹. After all the sanctions packages and the start of the Ukraine war in November 2022, the difference was 3.3 times. The corresponding ratios for exports were 26.7 and 5.4.

		June 2013 million €	November 2016 million €	November 2019 million €	November 2021 million €	November 2022 million €	November 2025 million €
Export	Russia	2 951	2 088.3	2 290.5	2 608.6	1 220.2	600.8
	Ukraine	458.8	345.9	418.4	566.9	379.9	835.7
Import	Russia	3 165.2	2 360	2 537.8	3 130.2	1 321.9	78.4
	Ukraine	118.5	135.6	150.8	199.2	246.6	170.1
							Source: Eurostat

Corresponding tables for Germany and other EU countries can be found [via this link](#).




Figure 44: Indexed development of German exports to and imports from Russia

When we look at [the exports and imports of the major powers with Germany](#), the United States and China are currently the most important in terms of exports. China had even overtaken the United States as Germany's largest export destination for a few months, but the start of the war in Ukraine significantly increased exports to the United States. In terms of imports, China is clearly the largest supplier of goods. In terms of both imports and exports, Russia is a clearly smaller player than China and the United States in Germany's trade policy "competition". The part of the trade with Russia that had to be given up was what had guaranteed Germany a significant competitive advantage in the manufacture of many industrial products.

The latest available data for Germany and the USA according to US customs statistics can be found at https://karirast.com/USA-GB/4280_sitc_m.html. The United States stopped publishing more detailed SITC data to February 2025. [Eurostat's data can be used to determine the current status of trade in goods between the US and Germany.](#)

Trade in goods between the United States and Germany has been profitable for Germany, with the trade balance still running a monthly surplus of 5-7 billion euros.

The war in Ukraine has provided a significant boost to **Rheinmetall AG**, the manufacturer of the Leopard tanks. The company's stock market value has multiplied during the war in Ukraine.




Figure 45: Rheinmetall AG share price development

The German Frankfurt Stock Exchange index has also been trending upwards during the war in Ukraine, despite the many disadvantages caused by sanctions on the country's energy, chemical and metals production.




Figure 46: Development of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange DAX index during sanctions

4.7 Austria

In euro terms, Austria's imports from Russia have remained at around a couple of hundred million euros per month between 2014 and 2020. As the situation regarding Ukraine became more tense, the value of Austria's imports from Russia multiplied due to increases in global energy prices.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Austria	3.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	0.9	0.6
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Austria	1.7	1.6	1.1	2.7	3.0	0.0
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Austria	2.6	1.6	1.3	2.1	2.0	0.3
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
Source: Eurostat							




Figure 47: Indexed development of Austria's exports to and imports from Russia

During the sanctions period, [Austria's exports to the major powers](#), the United States, have been worth as much in euros per month as Austria's combined exports to China and Russia. In terms of imports, China has

been at the top, and Russia and the United States have been relatively equal, until the situation around Ukraine caused a significant increase in the price of energy products.

In 2024, Austria has also surprisingly managed to mark the country of import of natural gas purchases from over a decade ago as **QZ**, i.e. a country not specified for commercial or defense reasons in foreign trade. One can still only wonder who will ultimately benefit from this change in the “import country”. The question remains why this change has only been made for gas imports, but not for several other commodities imported from Russia? In November 2024, the [Austrian energy company OMV stopped payments to Gazprom and as a result, Gazprom stopped gas supplies to Austria](#).




Figure 48: Import of gases (Sitc 34) into Austria

4.8 Switzerland

Switzerland's imports of goods from Russia were already quite low before the sanctions began in 2014. As a mountainous landlocked country, Switzerland's opportunities to connect economically to the gas and oil pipelines that were previously advantageous to Europe have been limited. Although Switzerland has maintained its old role of neutrality to some extent, it has adapted its relationship with Russia, following the "policies" of the EU and the US.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Switzerland	1.49	0.7	1.2	1.6	0.9	0.5
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Switzerland	0.16	0.7	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.0
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Switzerland	0.88	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.3
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Federal Office for Customs and Border Security FOCBS and Eurostat

The figures for Switzerland in the table do not include gold bars and other precious metals, coins, gems and precious stones, works of art and antiques. When these are taken into account, Switzerland's imports from Russia in particular are often significantly more "valuable". For example, Switzerland's imports from Russia in June 2024 without precious metals etc. were CHF 1,027,566, while with precious metals etc. they were CHF 53,934,904.




Figure 49: Indexed development of Swiss exports to and imports from Russia

4.9 France

Both imports from and exports to Russia have been a small “business” for France in euro terms, representing a good percentage of the country’s total exports and imports of goods. After the war in Ukraine began, imports from Russia to France rose to a record level for the entire sanctions period for a few months.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	France	2.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.5	0.4
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	France	1.9	1.0	1.2	1.9	1.3	0.6
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	France	2.0	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.0	0.5
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Eurostat




Figure 50: Indexed development of France's exports to and imports from Russia

At the beginning of the sanctions period, [the monthly imports of goods from China and the US to France](#) were almost the same size. In 2020, Chinese imports increased for a couple of years, until US imports took over after the war in Ukraine. In terms of exports, the largest in euro terms is exports to the United States. Compared to other major powers, French exports to and imports from Russia have been significantly lower.

French arms producers Thales Group and Dassault Aviation have also benefited from the upswing in the sector caused by the war in Ukraine.




Figure 51: Thales Group share price development




Figure 52: Dassault Aviation share price development

4.10 Belgium

Belgium's share of Russian imports and exports in the country's total trade in goods was already quite small before the start of the Russian sanctions. However, there are product groups in particular in imports from Russia that Belgium cannot accept being sanctioned. One of these is the import of diamonds.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Belgium	1.4	1.1	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.5
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Belgium	2.2	1.7	2.0	1.8	1.4	0.4
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Belgium	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.1	0.4
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
Source: Eurostat							




Figure 53: Indexed development of Belgian exports to and imports from Russia

Among the major powers, the United States has been by far Belgium's most important trading partner in goods. This was particularly true for exports. In the second half of 2020, monthly imports from China began to reach the value of imports from the United States, and in some months China emerged as the most important importing country. This was particularly true in the second half of 2022.




Figure 54: Evolution of Belgian export and import values with China, the United States and Russia

4.11 Netherlands

The Netherlands is in many ways the logistics hub of the European Union. Many goods imported into Rotterdam continue their journey to a new country, often with a “new” country of origin. [When looking at the major powers as trading partners of the Netherlands](#), China has been clearly the most significant in terms of imports during the sanctions period, and the USA has been at the top in terms of exports. [The trade balance of goods between the USA and the Netherlands has been almost balanced, especially compared to the trade situation between China and the Netherlands](#), which has been in deficit for the Netherlands by more than 10 billion euros per month throughout 2022.

Russia has not been a very significant export destination for the Netherlands in terms of exports euro value. Before the war in Ukraine, Dutch exports to Russia were just over 0.5 billion euros per month, while the value of monthly imports from Russia during the same period was 3-4 times greater.

		<i>June 2013 %</i>	<i>November 2016 %</i>	<i>November 2019 %</i>	<i>November 2021 %</i>	<i>November 2022 %</i>	<i>November 2025 %</i>
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Netherlands	1.5	1.1	1.6	1.2	0.5	0.3
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Netherlands	5.1	4.1	3.2	5.0	1.7	0.2
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Netherlands	3.2	2.5	2.3	3.0	1.1	0.2
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 55: Indexed development of Netherland's exports and imports to Russia

China has been the Netherlands' most important trading partner among the major powers. The United States is a larger export destination for the Netherlands than China, but its huge imports from China put it at the top of its trade in goods. For the Netherlands, trade with China generated a trade deficit of 8–11 billion per month in the last months of the year. [The Netherlands' overall trade balance](#) was in surplus (4–9 billion euros per month), although trade in goods with the United States and Russia had also been in deficit throughout the period under review.

4.12 Czech Republic

The Czech Republic's exports to and imports from Russia have developed mainly in line with Finland's during the sanctions period, with the exception of imports since the start of the war in Ukraine. [Russia's role in the Czech Republic's foreign trade of goods is surprisingly small](#). In exports, the shares of the United States and Russia were almost equal until the situation began to tighten around Ukraine in 2021. In imports, China is clearly the most significant of the major powers for the Czech Republic, with the value of imports from there exceeding imports from the United States or Russia many times over.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Czech Republic	3.8	2.1	2.4	1.6	0.4	0.2
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Czech Republic	4.6	2.2	1.9	1.3	1.2	0.5
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Czech Republic	4.1	2.2	2.1	1.4	0.8	0.4
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
Source: Eurostat							




Figure 56: Indexed development of Czech Republic's exports to and imports from Russia

4.13 Slovakia

During the sanctions, Slovakia has “successfully” reduced its exports to Russia and as landlocked country less “successfully” reduced its imports from Russia.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Slovakia	3.8	2.6	1.8	1.3	0.5	0.2
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Slovakia	11.9	3.8	3.1	5.9	5.9	1.3
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Slovakia	7.8	3.2	2.5	3.6	3.3	0.7
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Eurostat




Figure 57: Indexed development of Slovakia's exports to and imports from Russia

4.14 Hungary

Hungary, especially in the wake of the events in Ukraine, has taken a different line in its relations with Russia than most EU countries. This has greatly irritated the US and EU leadership. As a landlocked country, Hungary has fewer options to organize and secure the necessary energy imports than countries with access to the sea.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Hungary	3.6	1.7	2.0	1.4	1.2	0.5
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Hungary	6.8	2.0	2.6	3.4	9.1	2.1
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Hungary	5.1	1.9	2.3	2.4	5.4	1.3
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 58: Indexed development of Hungarian exports to and imports from Russia

4.15 Italy

As the situation around Ukraine began to escalate in 2021, Italy's imports from Russia doubled in value due to a sharp rise in energy prices. After the war in Ukraine continued for a year, Italy had time to reorganize its energy imports and Italian imports from Russia fell to a level that matched that of most EU countries.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Italy	2.7	1.7	1.7	1.4	0.9	0.6
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Italy	4.4	2.6	3.4	4.9	2.4	0.2
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Italy	3.5	2.1	2.5	3.1	1.6	0.4
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
Source: Eurostat							




Figure 59: Indexed development of Italian exports to and imports from Russia

Leonardo S.p.A. is one of the largest industrial groups and technology companies in Italy. In 2023, [the group was the thirteenth largest arms company in the world according to the Swedish Peace Research Institute SIPRI](#). The war in Ukraine has also been a favorable time for its shares to rise in value.




Figure 60: Leonardo S.p.A. share price development on the Milan Stock Exchange

4.16 Spain

Russia has been a marginal trading partner for Spain in terms of exports and imports of goods, when measured by the value of trade in goods. Of the major powers, the most important for Spain in terms of exports has been the USA and in terms of imports China. During 2026, relations between the left-wing Spanish government and Trump have become strained after Spain banned the United States from using military bases in Spain in US military operations against Iran. President Trump has threatened to completely stop trade between the two countries.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Spain	1.0	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.2	0.2
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Spain	2.5	0.9	0.8	1.7	1.4	0.4
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Spain	1.8	0.8	0.7	1.2	0.8	0.4
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	





Figure 61: Indexed development of Spanish exports to and imports from Russia

4.17 Portugal

Even before the start of sanctions against Russia in 2014, Russia's importance in Portugal's trade in goods was minor.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Portugal	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Portugal	2.8	2.1	0.6	1.4	0.1	0.0
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Portugal	1.8	1.3	0.5	0.9	0.1	0.0
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	



4.18 Romania

Although Romania is almost a neighbor of Russia and the countries share a history with the Soviet Union during World War II, its share of trade in goods with Russia, both in terms of exports and imports, has been quite small even before the sanctions. Among the major powers, China is clearly the most significant in terms of imports for Romania, and the United States is the most significant in terms of exports.

		<i>June 2013 %</i>	<i>November 2016 %</i>	<i>November 2019 %</i>	<i>November 2021 %</i>	<i>November 2022 %</i>	<i>November 2025 %</i>
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Romania	2.9	1.6	1.6	1.4	0.4	0.1
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Romania	3.7	2.9	2.9	3.2	1.1	0.0
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Romania	3.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	0.8	0.0
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 63: Indexed development of Romanian exports to and imports from Russia

4.19 Greece

As an export destination, Russia has been of relatively minor importance to Greece in terms of the value of its exports of goods. The situation has been different when it comes to imports. Despite the sanctions, the value of imports from Russia has been almost a tenth of the value of Greek imports of goods.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Greece	2.3	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.2	0.1
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Greece	10.3	8.3	5.4	8.1	8.4	1.1
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Greece	7.3	5.6	3.6	5.3	5.4	0.7
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Eurostat




Figure 64: Indexed development of Greek exports to and imports from Russia

Among the major powers, the US has been more significant than China and Russia in the export of goods to Greece during the sanctions period and especially during the war in Ukraine. In terms of imports of goods, Russia and China have been relatively evenly matched as the most significant importers of the major powers. The transportation of Russian oil has been a very significant source of income for the huge Greek-owned tanker fleet, so Greece has been against the extension of EU sanctions to the transportation of Russian oil.

4.20 Bulgaria

Russia has not been a very significant export destination for Bulgaria before and during the sanctions. Imports from Russia have played a significant role. Before the sanctions, almost a fifth of Bulgaria's imports came from Russia. The sanctions and the aftermath of the termination of the South Stream gas pipeline project in December 2014 caused a significant decrease in Russian imports. Russia has supplied Bulgaria with most of its natural gas needs. As the situation in Ukraine has become more tense, US LNG has also taken over the market in Bulgaria.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2024 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Bulgaria	2.6	1.7	2.1	1.6	1.3	1.1
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Bulgaria	19.7	9.4	7.9	6.9	10.5	1.7
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Bulgaria	12.0	5.7	5.1	4.5	6.2	1.4
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
Source: Eurostat							




Figure 65: Indexed development of Bulgarian exports to and imports from Russia

4.21 Denmark

For Denmark, Russia's share in the value of its exports and imports of goods has been small. During the sanctions period, imports from Russia have fluctuated greatly from month to month.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Denmark	1.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.2
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Denmark	1.3	1.6	2.1	1.3	0.3	0.2
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Denmark	1.6	1.2	1.5	1.1	0.3	0.2
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Eurostat




Figure 66: Indexed development of Danish exports to and imports from Russia




Figure 67: Danish pork (Sitc 0122) exports to China and the EU internal and external markets

Denmark has exported a significant part of its meat and meat products to China. When relations between the EU and China began to tighten, for example through punitive tariffs on Chinese electric cars, China responded by questioning the agricultural and production support policies of EU countries. [Denmark, Spain and to a lesser extent also Finland would have interests in protecting the lucrative export](#) of meat products to China from an agricultural policy perspective.

4.22 Norway

In terms of the monetary value of exports, Russia's importance to Norway is almost non-existent. Imports from Russia to Norway are considerably more active. Despite the war in Ukraine, more than half of the monthly import value has recently come from imports of SITC Group 3 products, oil and gas. Russia's current role in Europe, resulting from the tense relations between Russia and the Western camp, has a huge impact on the Norwegian economy. By pushing Russia out of the European market, it has opened up significant additional demand and markets for oil and gas produced by Norway.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Norway	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Norway	2.0	1.2	2.3	2.9	0.9	0.2
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Norway	1.2	0.7	1.1	1.1	0.4	0.1
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Lähde: Statistisk sentralbyrå Statistics Norway ja Eurostat




Figure 68: Indexed development of Norway's exports to and imports from Russia

During the war in Ukraine, Norway has supplied 2-3 billion euros worth of natural gas to the European Union every month, according to Eurostat statistics. The gas pipeline from Norway to Poland (Baltic Pipe) was “appropriately” put into operation the day after the Nord Stream gas pipelines were blown up.




Figure 69: Development of the value of gas imported by the EU from Norway each month (Sitc 34)

4.23 Sweden

During the sanctions period, Sweden's imports from and exports to Russia developed at roughly the same pace as Finland's. After the war in Ukraine began, Sweden quickly reduced its imports from Russia to a fraction of what it had been before. Sweden is one of the first EU countries to have succeeded in ending its imports from Russia.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Sweden	2.1	1.5	2.1	1.3	0.7	1.5
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Sweden	6.2	2.9	2.2	1.2	0.0	0.0
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Sweden	4.1	2.2	2.1	1.2	0.4	0.7
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 70: Indexed development of Swedish exports to and imports from Russia

For Saab Ab, the core of the Swedish defense industry, the start of the war in Ukraine meant a significant increase in the stock market price, i.e. the company's value. During the war, the company's value has multiplied in a couple of years.




Figure 71: Saab Ab's share price development

4.24 Poland

Like the Baltic countries, the Polish leadership has expressed its opinion on Russia and Russians very bluntly. [When looking at the development of the value of Poland's exports to different major powers](#), Russia's position as a larger export destination for Poland than the United States until the beginning of the Ukrainian war is surprising, considering the aggressive statements of the Polish leadership during the sanctions period even before the situation escalated into war. In terms of imports, China has been the most significant of the major powers since 2015. In terms of both gas (Sitc 34) and [oil products \(Sitc 33\)](#), Russia supplied the most significant part of Poland's needs until 2022.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Poland	5.7	2.7	3.3	2.6	1.3	0.6
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Poland	11.8	5.9	6.0	6.9	2.3	0.3
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Poland	8.8	4.3	4.6	4.8	1.8	0.4
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
							Source: Eurostat

Ukraine, as Poland's neighbor, has played a greater role in Poland's foreign trade of goods than Ukraine has with other EU countries. [Poland's exports to Ukraine had been quite high even before the sanctions began](#). Imports have remained low, most obviously due to the structure of the Ukrainian economy and the lack of interesting imported goods. As the situation surrounding Ukraine has tightened, imports from Ukraine to Poland have also more than doubled in value.

		June 2013 <i>million €</i>	November 2016 <i>million €</i>	November 2019 <i>million €</i>	November 2021 <i>million €</i>	November 2022 <i>million €</i>	November 2025 <i>million €</i>
Export	Russia	729.9	457.3	689.5	735.8	430.6	176.1
	Ukraine	358.9	413.4	429.6	601.4	1,230.0	1,235.6
Import	Russia	1,476.3	965.6	1,228.8	1,954.4	750.1	81.6
	Ukraine	116.8	184.2	185.3	347.0	533.9	372.9
							Suorce: Eurostat




Figure 72: Indexed development of Polish exports to and imports from Russia

In the current European situation, Poland, as a relatively large and populous neighbour of Ukraine, is one of the most important EU and NATO countries. The majority of Western arms shipments to Ukraine pass through Poland.

In relation to the threat to Poland in the policy of Russian relations, [the development of the market shares of Polish trade in goods with the United States, Russia and China is interesting](#). Even during the sanctions period, up until the beginning of the Ukrainian war, Russia was Poland's largest export destination among the major powers. After the Ukrainian war began, Polish exports to Russia decreased significantly. China has been by far the smallest export destination among the major powers for Poland. [In terms of imports, China has been by far the most significant among the major powers and the size of the trade deficit with](#)

[China for Poland is enormous](#). In the autumn of 2025, Poland briefly closed rail traffic from China via Belarus, citing the security risk posed by military exercises in Belarus with Belarus and Russia. This caused a crisis in rail freight transport between the EU and China.

4.25 Estonia

Trade between Estonia and Russia has been relatively brisk since the Crimea sanctions began in 2014, considering the colourful language used by leading Estonian politicians about Russia, its leadership, and Russians in general. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Estonia has somewhat reduced its exports to Russia, while imports initially rose to record levels. In 2023, imports from Russia quickly shrank to almost nothing compared to before. Imports from Russia were mainly intermediate industrial goods, such as fuels and lubricants.

The attitude of the leadership of Estonia and other Baltic countries towards Russia and trade with it during the sanctions could be characterised by the saying: Do as we say, not as we do. The leaderships of the Baltic countries are competing to see who can come up with the wildest new sanctions demand, while the countries continue to trade with their main enemy, which is profitable and important to them.

The Estonian leadership, the president and the prime minister, are constantly leaking views to the public that could be described as dangerous and at least ill-considered. The country's leadership's wishes to break up Russia are certainly not ignored in the Russian media and political debate. In an interview, former prime minister Kaja [Kallas claims that Putin prevented her from becoming NATO Secretary General](#). I suppose, that Putin would gladly have recommended Kallas to be next NATO leader, because of her obvious military and diplomatic skills.

		<i>June 2013 %</i>	<i>November 2016 %</i>	<i>November 2019 %</i>	<i>November 2021 %</i>	<i>November 2022 %</i>	<i>November 2025 %</i>
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Estonia	11.4	6.8	6.2	4.5	4.0	1.2
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Estonia	4.7	5.9	6.3	8.9	5.8	0.3
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Estonia	7.8	6.3	6.2	6.8	5.0	0.7
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 73: Indexed development of Estonian exports to and imports from Russia

The share of major powers in Estonia's trade in goods is significant. In terms of exports, the United States has been the most significant since mid-2018, after Russia had been "in the lead" before that. In terms of imports, the United States is clearly lagging behind Estonia's imports from Russia and China. Estonia's trade balance with the United States was in surplus for it and with China, which is typical for EU countries, it was in quite a deficit. After imports from Russia dried up, the trade balance between the countries has been in surplus for Estonia since the beginning of 2023.

The events of November 2023 in the threats of border closures in relation to asylum applications are problematic for Estonia. Estonia's exports to Russia are still relatively significant for the country and the country has a significantly large Russian-speaking minority (23 percent of the population). Estonia's close location to Europe's fourth largest city, St. Petersburg, gave it a considerable economic "competitive advantage".

4.26 Latvia

Despite its aggressively critical stance towards Russia, Latvia has not been an exemplary “observer” of sanctions, quite the opposite. In particular, imports from Russia have often been many times higher than before the sanctions were imposed in 2014. Since the situation has become tense around Ukraine and the war has begun, imports from Russia have continued at a fairly high level.

For Latvia, Russia, as a large neighboring country, especially in terms of exports, has been a significant target for the country's economy. Even during the sanctions period, Latvia's exports to Russia have at times represented almost a fifth of the country's total exports of goods. In October 2022, the largest group of goods in exports to Russia was **CN 22**, beverages, spirits and vinegar, representing 45 percent of Latvia's exports to Russia that month. Could Latvia find markets elsewhere for the exports and imports that are now going to and coming from Russia? In terms of exports, it is unlikely to happen very cheaply, quickly or easily. As recently as November 2023, exports to Russia represented over ten percent of Latvia's exports of goods.

		<i>June 2013 %</i>	<i>November 2016 %</i>	<i>November 2019 %</i>	<i>November 2021 %</i>	<i>November 2022 %</i>	<i>November 2023 %</i>
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Latvia	17.4	14.2	17.2	11.0	10.9	3.8
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Latvia	5.1	8.1	6.6	8.3	4.0	0.4
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Latvia	10.6	11.0	11.6	9.6	7.2	1.9
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 74: Indexed development of Latvian exports to and imports from Russia

Of the major powers, the USA, Russia and China, Russia has been and still is the most important for Latvia in terms of exports. Even during the war in Ukraine, the value of exports to Russia each month has exceeded the combined amount of Latvian exports to the USA and China. Also in terms of imports, Russia, despite the sanctions, is the largest supplier of goods, with the value of Chinese monthly deliveries of goods in recent years at times approaching and sometimes exceeding the monthly value of Russian deliveries. Before the start of the war in Ukraine, Latvia mainly used Russian gas (Sitc 34). Even during the war in Ukraine, trade in goods with Russia has generated a large trade surplus for Latvia. This is quite exceptional even compared to most of Russia's bordering neighbors in the European Union.

A significant part of Latvia's exports to Russia are earned by exporting products of the Sitc 1 group, drinks and tobacco. What is surprising is that Latvia's role as a "major" wine producer, the main part of its exports is wine. The Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania, are responsible for a large part of the EU's drinks and tobacco exports to Russia. What is strange is that imports of Sitc group 1, drinks and tobacco, from Russia seem to be sanctioned, at least according to Eurostat import statistics, as their exports seem to continue to be brisk despite the war in Ukraine.




Figure 75: Latvian exports of beverages and tobacco (Sic 1) to Russia

In relation to the size of the countries and populations of Latvia and Lithuania, a considerable amount of wine is imported there from the internal market of the European Community and then exported from there to Russia. In the case of Latvia, the income from wine exports to Russia at customs prices is worth a fraction of the wine imports from the internal market. Thus, the costs of local wine consumption can be said to be offset many times over by the profits from wine exports to Russia. [Latvia's population of 1.9 million imports wine from the internal market of the EU many times more than countries with significantly larger populations.](#) It can therefore be said that Latvia, along with Lithuania, continues the "bootlegging" traditions of the Baltic countries. What is ironic about this is that there are either no sanctions at all or they have not been observed in the case of Latvia and Lithuania. Both countries have been at the forefront of the wildest and loudest demands for sanctions. At the same time, Latvia in particular has earned hundreds of millions annually by exporting wines from Southern European countries to Russia. It would be astonishing if none of the eighteen sanctions packages had included the export of alcoholic products. [The import of Russian alcoholic products has certainly been sanctioned and stopped.](#)




Figure 76: Latvia's export of wine made from grapes (Sic 1121) to Russia and their import into Latvia from the EU internal and external markets

When the Finnish State broadcaster YLE news reported on the continued business of some large Western companies, including those also operating in Finland, in exporting chocolate and ice cream to Russia and

manufacturing it in their factories there, the audience comments on the story were full of harsh comments about how shameless this is. The messages demanded to immediately boycott these Western “waste” products. One could imagine the fury it would cause, when this “soldering” of Russians, which has generated tens of millions for Latvia and Lithuania, also during the war in Ukraine, became known.

4.27 Lithuania

Before the sanctions began in 2014, Russia was by far Lithuania's largest trading partner in goods. A quarter of Lithuania's imports came from Russia and a fifth of all exports came from Russian exports. Russia's importance to Lithuania in terms of the structure of foreign trade was therefore considerably greater than it was for Estonia and Latvia before the sanctions began.

During the initial period of sanctions, both exports to and imports from Russia decreased significantly, while maintaining its position as an important destination for Lithuania's trade in goods. During the war in Ukraine, imports from Russia have shrunk to almost nothing compared to before. In the current situation, it is most likely only a matter of time before Lithuania's exports to Russia suffer the same fate as imports from Russia, i.e. they will decline radically. Along with Finland, Lithuania has reduced its trade in goods with Russia the proportionally most among EU countries.

		<i>June 2013 %</i>	<i>November 2016 %</i>	<i>November 2019 %</i>	<i>November 2021 %</i>	<i>November 2022 %</i>	<i>November 2025 %</i>
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Lithuania	20.0	13.3	14.8	11.2	6.3	1.2
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Lithuania	24.9	12.7	12.4	14.8	1.7	0.7
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Lithuania	22.5	13.0	13.6	13.0	3.9	0.9
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	

The table below shows the values of Lithuania's imports and exports with Russia and Ukraine in sample months. Despite the war, Lithuania's imports from Ukraine have remained small from the perspective of the country's economy. Lithuania's exports to Ukraine have increased significantly during the sanctions period, but despite all the sanctions and its own stance, that trade was still less valuable than the monthly exports to Russia after the war in Ukraine had been going on for almost two years.

		June 2013 <i>million €</i>	November 2016 <i>million €</i>	November 2019 <i>million €</i>	November 2021 <i>million €</i>	November 2022 <i>million €</i>	November 2025 <i>million €</i>
Export	Russia	393.7	276.8	379.8	378.7	252.2	35.7
	Ukraine	46.2	59.1	108.0	141.2	130.4	136.6
Import	Russia	485.5	268.4	330.8	548.4	77.2	24.2
	Ukraine	15.0	19.0	24.7	46.0	46.8	38.3

Source: Eurostat




Figure 77: Indexed development of Lithuania's exports to and imports from Russia.

Among the great powers, Russia was Lithuania's larger trading partner than the United States and China before the start of the Ukraine war. During the war, the United States supplanted Russia as an importer of goods, mainly through imports of its highly valued liquefied natural gas. Before the actual war, Lithuania had

a surplus in trade with the United States. [After the war continued, Lithuania had a deficit in trade with the United States.](#)

Along with Latvia, Lithuania has been an active EU transit country for alcoholic beverages, especially wines (Sitc 1121), exported to Russia.




Figure 78: Exports of wine made from Lithuanian grapes (Sitc 1121) to Russia and their imports from the EU internal and external markets

4.28 Serbia

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2024 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Serbia	6.0	6.3	4.9	3.2	3.8	1.5
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Serbia	5.0	9.0	11.9	5.5	8.0	2.0
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Serbia	5.5	7.8	8.9	4.5	6.2	1.8
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 79: Indexed development of Serbian exports to and imports from Russia

4.29 Ukraine

As a former part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was closely linked to the Russian economy and industrial production until the events of 2014. As recently as 2013, almost a third of Ukraine's exports went to Russia. The country's economy was powered by the minerals and industrial production of the Russian-speaking Donbass, as well as by the commissions generated by cheap raw materials from Russia, as well as gas and oil pipelines. The measures taken after the 2014 coup against the country's significant Russian-speaking minority led to the annexation of Crimea and the secession of the industrialised and predominantly Russian-speaking eastern parts of the country.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2024 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Ukraine	27.0	14.0	10.1	10.2		
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Ukraine	22.4	8.6	6.3	4.7		
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Ukraine	24.6	11.4	8.4	7.6		
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7
						Source: Eurostat	




Figure 80: Indexed development of Ukraine's exports to and imports from Russia

In 2021, Russia was the world's largest wheat exporter and Ukraine the fifth largest¹. In 2023, several EU countries, mainly in Ukraine's neighborhood, have blocked imports of Ukrainian grain to protect their own agriculture. As regards Ukrainian and Russian grain and grain products (Sitc 04), imports to EU countries have mainly taken place from Ukraine. The EU leadership has quite directly promised Ukraine EU membership during its many visits to Kiev during the war. It will be interesting to read how that union can be adjusted to the already complex, contentious and expensive EU agricultural policy for the citizens of the member states. Adding to the issue is the fact that a large part of Ukraine's productive agricultural lands are already under the control of international investors. On 25 June 2024, it was announced that the European Union and Ukraine would start membership negotiations.

The figure below shows the development of Ukraine's and Russia's imports and exports with the EU. Before the sanctions period that began in 2014 and in terms of EU imports and exports, Russia was a significantly more significant partner in goods trade than Ukraine. When the sanctions began, EU exports to Russia decreased significantly and finally, after the war in Ukraine began, exports fell within a few months to almost the same level as the value of exports to Ukraine at that time. As for imports, it was more difficult for the European Union to reduce them quickly, because gas, oil, metals, etc. were needed to maintain its own production and arranging replacement imports was difficult, costly and time-consuming. When the war began in February 2022, imports from Russia quickly decreased sharply. After more than a year of war, imports to EU countries from Russia began to be of the same order of magnitude as the value of imports from Ukraine at that time.




Figure 81: Development of the value of EU exports and imports with Russia and Ukraine

The structure of imports and exports of Ukraine to various EU countries at the Sitc main number level [can be seen on the website at this link](#).




Figure 82: Development of Ukraine's exports and imports with China, the United States and Russia

4.30 Georgia

Georgia has significantly increased its exports to Russia during the tense relations between Ukraine and Russia and during the war. In November 2024, almost a quarter of Georgia's exports went to Russia.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Georgia	5.6	16.3	17.8	19.0	18.0	16.7
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Georgia	6.9	10.0	11.5	11.2	14.7	11.5
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Georgia	6.7	11.3	12.8	13.1	15.3	12.5
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Eurostat




Figure 83: Indexed development of Georgian-Russian exports and imports

4.31 Türkiye

Türkiye's exports to and imports from Russia developed in line with Western countries after the sanctions began. When the situation between Ukraine and Russia intensified in late 2021, Türkiye broke away from the EU and US sanctions policy. As a result, both Türkiye's exports to and imports from Russia began to rise sharply. This development, Türkiye's slow move away from the Western camp as it develops its relations with China and Russia, has not been viewed with much satisfaction by NATO, the EU and the US. Türkiye is NATO's most significant military power, measured by the size of its army, on this side of the Atlantic. Türkiye's exports to and imports from Russia developed in line with Western countries after the sanctions began. When the situation between Ukraine and Russia intensified in late 2021, Türkiye broke away from the EU and US sanctions policy. As a result, both Türkiye's exports to and imports from Russia began to rise sharply. This development, Türkiye's slow move away from the Western camp as it develops its relations with China and Russia, has not been viewed with much satisfaction by NATO, the EU and the US. Türkiye is NATO's most significant military power, measured by the size of its army, on this side of the Atlantic.

Russia has given Türkiye a significant and advantageous position as a broker for Russian gas, oil and grain. The Republic of Türkiye's exports of goods to Russia have also doubled during the war in Ukraine. In June 2024, Türkiye expressed its desire to join the BRICS group and forget about its intention to join the European Union and the associated decades-long negotiation process. This will have far-reaching effects on the position and opportunities of Europe and NATO. Trade in goods between EU countries and Türkiye is currently quite extensive and diverse. In early September 2024, Türkiye announced that it had applied for membership in the **BRICS** group.

		June 2013 %	November 2016 %	November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	Türkiye	4.2	1.9	2.7	2.5	4.6	2.8
	Finland	9.4	6.2	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	Türkiye	9.0	7.6	11.2	10.8	15.5	10.4
	Finland	16.5	12.2	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	Türkiye	7.2	5.1	7.2	7.1	11.0	7.3
	Finland	12.9	9.2	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: Eurostat




Figure 84: Indexed development of Türkiye's exports to and imports from Russia




Figure 85: Development of Türkiye's exports and imports with China, the United States and Russia

4.32 European Union

During the sanctions period, Finland's exports to Russia have developed in the same rhythm as the entire European Union's exports to Russia. The development of imports has not been so uniform. Especially during the war in Ukraine, Finland was able to reduce the amount of goods it purchased from Russia faster than the EU as a whole was able to.




Figure 86: Indexed development of EU exports to and imports from Russia

In the war between Ukraine and Russia, the attitude of most EU countries is openly hostile towards Russia and Russians. The table below shows the values of EU countries' exports and imports of goods to Russia and Ukraine in the different months of the sanctions period. Especially in terms of imports, despite all of the EU's almost sixteen sanctions packages, Russia is still significantly more significant for EU countries. Under the leadership of US President Trump, US foreign trade with its customs policy creates an environment that is even more difficult to manage and predict for European Community countries than before.

		June 2013 million €	November 2016 million €	November 2019 million €	November 2021 million €	November 2022 million €	November 2025 million €
Export	Russia	9,637.0	6,756.0	8,124.8	8,441.6	5,067.6	2,627.3
	Ukraine	1,835.5	1,641.5	2,133.9	2,833.5	3,361.2	4,244.6
Import	Russia	14,603.0	10,358.2	11,264.0	18,207.5	11,911.6	1,877.3
	Ukraine	972.9	1,178.9	1,582.3	2,342.7	2,910.8	1,957.3

Source: Eurostat

When looking at the EU's trade relations with the major powers, the United States, China and Russia, the United States has been the most important export destination for the EU, followed by China and Russia, and the last of the major powers. In terms of imports, China is clearly the first, with the value of its monthly imports rising to close to EUR 60 billion per month by the end of 2022. The United States is second, with the monthly value of its products supplied to the European Union exceeding EUR 30 billion per month by the end

of 2022. The EU's trade balance with China and Russia has been severely negative. This trade deficit has been offset by a significant trade surplus in goods trade with the United States. This surplus with the United States was rapidly shrinking as the geopolitical trade war intensified and the United States took over the European energy and arms markets. The turbulence at the start of President Trump's second term, with possible "punitive tariffs", has affected expectations for the development of goods trade between the United States and Europe.




Figure 87: Development of EU export and import values with the US, China and Russia

The US has taken over the EU gas market (Sitc 34) since 2021, especially as the situation around Ukraine has intensified, through sanctions and the "elimination" of the Nord Stream gas pipelines. The picture below also shows how the price of gas imported by the EU has multiplied since the problems began. It is reasonable to assume that due to the dramatic increase in gas prices, EU gas consumption has also decreased significantly. As a result, the European Union industry, such as chemicals, metals and fertilizers, which is dependent on relatively cheap energy prices, is in serious trouble.




Figure 88: Import of gas (Sitc 34) into EU countries




Figure 89: Import of liquefied natural gas (Sitc 3431) into EU countries

In the case of oil products (Sitc 33), Russia has also been partially pushed aside and the USA has captured part of the EU market. In late 2022 and early 2023, Russian oil imports from Russia have declined rapidly and are starting to approach zero. However, this does not mean that Russian oil and its refined products are not being imported. Now it is just happening through other countries, such as India, which purchases massive amounts of Russian crude oil at large discounts and then sells its refined products to EU countries. The calculations and hopes of Western countries that an oil-producing country the size of Russia could be completely excluded from the market are an indication of a rather special economic education of people who act as experts and decision-makers in the US and EU administrations.




Figure 90: Development of the value of EU imports of mineral oils and their products (Sitc 33)

4.33 China

For China, data is only available from 2018 onwards. Until mid-2021, trade in goods between China and Russia developed quite slowly and steadily in terms of the trade balance. When the US administration's stance towards China also became clearer during the Biden presidency, trade between China and Russia picked up. After the war in Ukraine began, China clearly reduced the volume of trade in goods between the two countries, fearing secondary sanctions. After US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, trade between the People's Republic of China and Russia rose to record levels. In December 2023, it was reported that Russia is now the world's most significant market for new Chinese cars.

		November 2019 %	November 2021 %	November 2022 %	November 2025 %
Share of exports to Russia in the country's total exports	China	2.1	2.0	2.6	2.9
	Finland	5.6	5.2	2.4	0.1
Share of imports from Russia in the country's total imports	China	3.0	3.2	4.7	5.0
	Finland	12.5	14.2	3.6	1.3
Share of trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods	China	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.7
	Finland	9.0	9.8	3.0	0.7

Source: General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China and Eurostat




Figure 91: Development of the value of China's exports to and imports from Russia

In trade between China and Russia, there has been a clear effort to achieve a reasonable balance of trade, which better enables the countries to use their own currencies in mutual trade. Today, the role of the dollar in trade between the countries is minor.

Among EU countries, Finland, along with Germany and Denmark, has managed to export a relatively larger share of its total exports to China. The structure of European countries' exports to and imports from China at the SITC main level is presented on the following page. Almost without exception, the trade balance with China has been in deficit for European countries.




Figure 92: Share of EU countries' exports and imports to China in the country's total exports and imports

The structure of US-China trade on an annual basis and for the last known months, based on US customs statistics⁴, shows that Western political parties' threats to separate the economies of China and the West are high-level wishful thinking. 30 years ago, this might have been possible, but now so many products are imported from China that the West can no longer produce at competitive prices. In addition, the focus of research and development has changed significantly. The export restrictions on semiconductors to China are unlikely to change the situation, but only accelerate China's rapid development in terms of production and product development in that sector. In addition, China has numerous products whose export restrictions put Western countries' own production in considerable difficulty. These include rare earth metals, the production and stocks of which are controlled by China.

China is now also a huge market for many Western products. In the second half of 2023, the USA was forced to lift its export bans on microcircuits to China, because China has been by far the largest customer for US and other Western microcircuit manufacturers. The results of these manufacturers had deteriorated alarmingly when exports to China stopped. Without income from the Chinese market, the opportunities for Western microcircuit manufacturers and the company that makes the equipment required for their manufacture ([ASML Holding N.V.](#)) to finance the enormously expensive development of new products and new product generations in the sector have weakened. China has also begun to develop its own microcircuit manufacturing technology and equipment with enormous investment and speed. In a few years, the situation

⁴ USA ended to publishing the detailed SITC figures of its import and export to the figures of February 2025. Now only the new monthly figures of total import and export are published.

regarding export restrictions for products in this sector will most likely be completely opposite to the current situation.




Figure 93: Stock index of all companies traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange

The patent statistics of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) show that China is currently the leading force in almost every field of technology. The explanation for this fact is often that Chinese patents are all “illegal” copies of Western patents and obtained through espionage. Naturally, this claim, which is constantly repeated in the media, is always made without providing any concrete evidence. A patent is always a very detailed description of an invention, so proving a copy of a patent would often be quite simple in court and in public. Thus, proving massive systematic copying would be downright easy. Similar claims of copying were made in the 70s and 80s during Japan’s strong industrial and commercial growth. No evidence was presented at that time for these constantly repeated claims either. At the turn of the 2000s, managements of Western, including Finnish, companies, politicians and experts from economic research institutes advertised how cheap, profitable and sensible it was to transfer production to cheap labor in China. The public was told that the design and sales would still be handled here in the “West”, only the manufacturing would be transferred. Warnings about the rationality of this transfer were laughed at and it was stated that the Chinese did not know how to design, so transferring the manufacturing would be risk-free and cheap. Now the transfers are regretted, but restoring production is not simple when the factories and machines have been scrapped and the former skilled workforce has dispersed to world markets or retired.




Figure 94: Development of the number of patent applications in the United States, China, Japan and Europe




Figure 95: Development of the number of granted patents in the United States, China, Japan and Europe

4.34 Authoritarian countries

One of the central themes of Western propaganda has been the division of countries into democratic and authoritarian countries. Naturally, Western countries are choosing who belongs to which category⁵. [The following link shows](#) how much of the total exports of different EU countries come from authoritarian countries and what proportion of exports go to them.

It naturally raises moral questions whether oranges imported from authoritarian Egypt purchased by a customer in Finland are “more reprehensible” than those imported from democratic Israel. Many authoritarian countries, those that have allowed Western corporations to exploit their minerals, land and workforce without objection and at modest costs, are acceptable partners. In addition, the regimes of several countries considered authoritarian were brought to power by Western countries, especially the United States, and financed by them. Those authoritarian countries on the list, which act in accordance with their national interests and prevent the sale of their natural resources and workforce, are often the targets of sanctions and various levels of terrorism allegations, examples of which are Cuba, Venezuela, Iraq and Iran.

During the sanctions period before the Ukraine war, approximately 11-19 percent of Finland's total monthly exports went to countries classified as authoritarian. After the war in Ukraine began in February 2022, the share quickly dropped below 10 percent, as Finnish exports to Russia practically ceased.




Figure 96: Development of the share of Finnish exports to authoritarian countries in total Finnish exports

Before the war in Ukraine, imports from authoritarian countries ranged in monthly share of total imports from 14 to 25 percent. When imports from Russia were virtually eliminated during the war in Ukraine, the share of imports from authoritarian countries has fallen significantly to less than 10 percent of total imports.

Authoritarian countries are significant producers of raw materials and necessary goods. Many countries classified as authoritarian countries also exploit their cheap labor by producing cheap consumer goods and exporting them. This often happens in special tax-free zones in companies owned and managed by Western companies. Often, the raw materials acquired and products made with cheap labor are also exported to Western countries by the large Western companies that own them for further processing and sale. Thus, the products of authoritarian countries are the results of economic exploitation made possible by Western companies by the countries' authoritarian leaders. In addition, in many cases, the leadership and ruling elite of so-called authoritarian countries have been "helped" to power by Western countries and the funds they "earned" in their activities have been placed in Western banks and tax havens and invested in shares of Western listed companies.

⁵ **Authoritarian states:** Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Palestinian Territory, North Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Chad, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Venezuela, Russia, Vietnam, United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe




Figure 97: Development of the share of Finnish imports from authoritarian countries in Finland's total imports

Almost 200 years of the Monroe Doctrine and the “spread of democracy” have not made the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean well-educated, wealthy and democratically governed. It has guaranteed good profits for American companies, very cheap fruit for Americans and cheap metals for its industry. Many of the sights and ostentatious palaces of European capitals were built with the “revenues” obtained from the colonies. Nor were the opinions of the inhabitants of the colonies asked in these transfers of wealth. In this historical sense, the combination of democracy and “authoritarian foreign trade” is even “smiling” as a propagandistic concept. How can the fact that the citizens of the buying or selling country have the right to vote democratically have an impact on the social order of the other party country, when there is no logic and legal procedure followed in the trade relationship between the countries? A dictator with the most absurd human rights policies has often been a favourite partner for the sale or import of goods, and the media and political system of a “democratic” country are completely silent about it. At the same time, when it comes to another country, for which “authoritarianism” is more or less propaganda aimed at maintaining an enemy image, the media and political system do not spare their words. This is the case, for example, in the current Western propaganda targeting China, which does not bother the public with facts and evidence, but only makes a barrage of hard claims.

5 Summary

The world is clearly dividing into two camps. The so-called Western camp (the self-described “free world”) grouped around the United States, and the increasingly powerful and wealthy group of countries (BRICS) led by China and Russia. Finland has chosen the Western camp and is now a fanatical and obedient member of NATO. Our decision-makers comment in some astonishment when Russia reacts to Finland's provocative moves. Also strange is the pride and self-praise with which our decision-makers congratulate themselves on how successfully our previously most significant and geographically “natural” trading partner has been eliminated from the Finnish economy. The pride expressed in our media when Finland had managed to accompany US bombers in the front line of NATO nuclear weapons exercises on our planes was downright astonishing. Finland is naturally at the forefront of NATO's new plans. Finland and Sweden, the newest members of NATO, have risen to the top of the unemployment statistics in the EU. For some incomprehensible reason, this has come as a big surprise to decision-makers in Finland and Sweden.

In May 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Europe will not be Russia's partner for at least a generation. For Finland, a neighbor of Russia's important regions, St. Petersburg and Murmansk, and now an active member of a military alliance that is increasingly hostile to Russia, this continuation of poor relations does not bode well. With the eastern border closed and the military situation remaining tense, Finland will not be the most attractive destination for large investments, and many major companies will have to consider relocating their strategic facilities in Finland to safer environments. The hope expressed in public by the former Estonian Prime Minister, **Kaja Kallas**, on several occasions while still in the position of Prime Minister of Estonia, for Russia to disintegrate (= break up) into several small states that will willingly submit to the West, is a picture of the future that is very unlikely. The strengthening of the BRICS camp continues with unprecedented speed and force, and the dollar is slowly but surely losing its position as the leading reserve currency.

Finland is one of the few EU countries where trade with Russia before the sanctions period played a significant role in the country's national economy and which has “succeeded” in almost zeroing out its trade with Russia after the war in Ukraine had been going on for more than two years. As a small economy, Finland has been able to replace, at least in the short term, the significant import of several commodities from Russia that had previously been advantageous to it. Few Finns still understand what this new situation has cost and will still cost Finland. In November 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued its statement on the development and state of the Finnish economy. In the final months of 2025, relative unemployment in Finland and Sweden has placed them in the top three EU countries in terms of unemployment, and Finland has been placed in the EU's “watch category” due to its rapid debt accumulation. When we joined NATO, the main comment from decision-makers was that now our security has significantly improved and the future is bright with investments here reaching record levels. This has not happened with either “promise”.

For the EU countries, Russia has been a significant producer of several commodities, the role and affordability of which were very important in the EU countries' own production and their competitiveness. The fantasy put forward by many Western economists and country leaders that this huge producer can be displaced and removed from the market in its entirety is, to put it mildly, amusing. This removal from the market would only be successful if all of Russia's previous customers completely gave up using the commodity they imported and if the rest of the world had a correspondingly large unused production capacity of the commodities or a huge stock waiting for the event. For example, as a producer of aluminum and nickel, Russia has been the third most significant producer country. It is clear that if the amount of these metals produced by Russia were to be removed from the world market, the result would be a significant decrease in the use of that metal, accompanied by a large price increase. For most commodities, for example metals, it takes at least years or a decade to create new production and increase old production. China has sovereign control over most of the production chains essential to a new carbon-free future. These include the production of rare earth metals, battery metals, solar panel production, and related research and production.

Prominent American economic historian and economist **Michael Hudson** has put forward the view that the sanctions policy built around Ukraine is actually intended to neutralize Europe's economic and industrial competitiveness in order to strengthen the position of the United States.

How can different countries position themselves in their trade with Russia during sanctions?

In the figure depicting the status of different countries in complying with sanctions, the X-axis shows the percentage share of the country's trade in goods with Russia in the country's total trade in goods in June 2013. In the case of Finland, the value was 12.9%. The Y-axis shows the percentage of the value that remained in November 2023 when that 2023/11 share value is compared to the share value of the starting month 2013/06. For example, in the case of Finland, the value is $100 * 0.9 / 12.9 = 7.0\%$.



Figure 98: The position of different countries in complying with sanctions and the significance of Russian trade before the start of sanctions

The majority of the countries in this review have significantly reduced their trade with Russia, by more than 50 percent of what that trade represented in value to them in June 2013. For most of them, this significant reduction has occurred during the war in Ukraine.

For most countries, the share of Russian trade in goods was significantly smaller before the sanctions began than it represented for Finland and Russia's other border neighbours.

When our eastern border has practically been closed and the attitude towards Russia and Russians has become extremely hostile, we have at the same time lost the large markets of Western Russia, access to Russian airspace and the increasingly important Eurasian transport routes in its area. At the same time, we have lost the considerable investments and companies operating there that Finnish companies had managed to create in Russia over the decades. Re-establishing retail chains and various Finnish production companies in Russia is unlikely to succeed, even after the situation has calmed down.

As a prolonged cold war between the two blocs seems increasingly likely, it is obvious that Finland's chances of returning to the past are non-existent in its current position. The Western countries, Europe and the United States, have painted themselves into a corner, imagining that they currently have more pawns in this economic-scientific war. That other "camp" has the majority of raw materials and commodities, most of the current industrial production capacity and a leading role in scientific research, measured for example by patents. Someone had described the situation as one where the Western countries are training lawyers and sexologists en masse, while the rest of the world is focusing on training its students to become engineers and scientists.

Finland has become a periphery of the EU, where large-scale industrial projects are unlikely to be planned and built in the future. The reason is not only the military situation, but also the transportation of raw materials here. If the "home" of metal concentrates and ores is in Australia, South America or other locations across the oceans, it does not make much sense to transport them to battery metal factories in the Baltic Sea for processing. This made business and strategic sense even when a large part of the concentrates came from the East and cheap Russian energy was used in processing. Before the war in Ukraine, areas of many Finnish port cities were zoned for battery metal factories and the media reported on the competition for the billions that the Chinese were reportedly ready to invest in them. Now that news has been replaced by stories in which Russia, and increasingly China, are playing the villain, breaking into our water towers and, in the most imaginative (and always ultimately unproven) ways, destroying our "democracy."

When the war in Ukraine ends, with the highest probability of a Russian victory, Finland's geopolitical position and economic development will be in a very difficult situation. Russia will certainly not forget Finland's jump into NATO and how the Finnish-US DCA agreement, with its weapons depots and bases, changed the situation for it. Finland consciously threw into the dustbin of history its long-standing neutrality and the undeniably huge economic advantages that this had offered Finland in relation to the Soviet Union/Russia after World War II. Our political elite and our parties do not even try to discuss how we could return to reasonable coexistence. The only idea put forward by the current "majority" in power in the EU has been that Ukraine must win and that negotiations with Russia are not allowed.

Of course, estimating the value of a country's untapped natural resources is a bit of a "guess," but it does provide some direction for assessing the future. [Investopedia's list of the top 10 countries by the value of their natural resources](#) consists of the following countries: Russia (\$75 trillion), the USA (\$45 trillion), Saudi Arabia (\$34.4 trillion), Canada (\$33.2 trillion), Iran (\$27.3 trillion), China (\$23 trillion), Brazil (\$21.8 trillion), Australia (\$19.9 trillion), Iraq (\$15.9 trillion), and Venezuela (\$14.3 trillion). Considering how the world is regrouping, geopolitically and economically, the European Union, and especially Finland, should take the realities into account. On the other hand, the reality is also where Finland sources the majority of its imported goods and services, and where it delivers the goods we manufacture. The EU internal market is clearly and by far the most significant area, even compared to the major powers, in terms of both exports and imports. Thus, ultimately, the EU is the most important for Finland.




Figure 99: Development of the share of trade, exports and imports between Finland and the EU internal market

Just under 60 percent of our exports of goods go to the EU internal market and 70 percent of our imports come from the EU internal market. Therefore, maintaining the unity and functionality of the European Community's trade policy is of utmost importance to Finland. With a few exceptions, the situation is the same for other EU member states.




Figure 100: Share of EU countries' exports and imports to the EU internal market in the country's total exports and imports




Figure 101: Monthly development of Finnish exports and imports with China, the US, Russia and the EU internal market

As the large share of the EU internal market in EU exports and imports shows, ultimately the most important thing is to maintain the economic unity and functioning of the European Community. On the other hand, the idea that the EU could be self-sufficient is unfortunately fanciful. Europe's remaining industry needs a huge amount of goods that cannot be produced here. In addition, the "successful" disengagement from the energy and other raw materials provided by Russia has significantly weakened the region's economic competitiveness, as those goods have to be obtained from elsewhere.

At the beginning of 2026, the political and economic situation in the world and the EU region is very confusing. The unity of the EU and NATO is being severely tested, mainly as a result of the measures taken by the Trump administration that have proven costly for Europe and the economic changes caused by the sanctions policy of the Ukraine war. The Israeli and US attack on Iran in March 2026 made the situation even more dangerous for the whole world.

Appendix 2 Development of the share of goods trade with the United States, China, Germany and Sweden in Finland's total goods trade




Figure 102: Development of trade, export and import shares between Finland and the United States




Figure 103: Development of trade, export and import shares between Finland and China




Figure 104: Development of trade, export and import shares between Finland and Germany




Figure 105: Development of trade, export and import shares between Finland and Sweden

Appendix 3 Exchange rate developments




Figure 106: Euro/dollar (USD) exchange rate development




Figure 107: Euro/Yuan (CNY) exchange rate development




Figure 108: Euro to Indian Rupee (INR) exchange rate evolution




Figure 109: Euro/Turkish lira (TRY) exchange rate development




Figure 110: Development of the exchange rate between the euro and the British pound (GBP)




Figure 111: Euro and Saudi Arabian Riyal (SAR) exchange rate evolution




Figure 112: Euro/Japanese Yen (JPY) exchange rate development




Figure 113: Euro and South Korean Won (KRW) exchange rate evolution




Figure 114: Euro/Swiss Franc (CHF) exchange rate development




Figure 115: Development of the exchange rate between the euro and the Swedish krona (SEK)




Figure 116: Development of the exchange rate between the euro and the Norwegian krone (NOK)




Figure 117: Development of the exchange rate between the euro and the Danish krone (DKK)




Figure 118: Euro to Israeli Shekel (ILS) exchange rate evolution




Figure 119: Euro/Polish zloty (PLN) exchange rate development